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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 







This report considers the institutional framework which shapes the 
operating environment for the Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board.  The report highlights some of the impediments to 
Best Practice from the perspective of: 
   economic efficiency, 
   fairness and  
   the impact on the quantity and quality of water. 
This report will also consider the institutional framework and government 
policies within the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  The purpose is 
to: 
   identify potential impediments to best practice in the management of 
the resource; 
   identify potential gaps in the institutional framework as it exists; 
   ensure that our understanding of the framework is sufficient before 
moving forward to consider various incentive mechanisms for water 
management. 
The report provides an overview of some of the directions of change that 
might occur given the social and economic forces at work in the 
Catchment.  The Onkaparinga is an interesting case study as it has 
experienced some degradation as a result of land clearing and salinisation 
but it is not in a dire situation.  Further, the Catchment is in the enviable 
position of having achieved a considerable level of economic development 
with potential remaining.  At issue is how to balance the interests of the 
environment with aspirations for further social and economic development.  
Main Impediments 
The current institutional arrangements result in roughly four layers of 
government with an interest in natural resource management.  The layers 
are tied together in varying financial, statutory and regulatory 
arrangements.  Roughly, the hierarchy might be seen as: 
Commonwealth 
State 
Catchment Water Management Board 
Local Government. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 





Institutionally, the Catchment Water Management Board is slotted in 
between the State Government and Local Government because the 
Minister for Water Resources must approve all Catchment Water 
Management Plans but the Boards have the power to request changes to 
the Development Plans of Councils.  The Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board is approximately three years old and has been through 
a capacity building stage with the process of putting together the 
Catchment Water Management Plan. 
A proposed Integrated Natural Resource Management (INRM) Bill 
proposes to coordinate the management of resources in the State.  At 
least initially, the INRM groups will be established on an interim basis using 
existing NHT boundaries.  If the proposed powers to employ staff, 
contract work, apply for grants, etc, are implemented, then many of the 
Board’s existing functions will be duplicated. This can be expected to 
impede the capacity of the Board to work closely with the community in 
delivering change.  In particular, because the proposed new arrangements 
facilitate separation of delivery of positive financial incentives such as 
grants, etc, from regulatory and allocation arrangement, the proposed 
framework could seriously impede Board operations. 
If the result is division of the Board’s area into an INRM region for all the 
Adelaide Hills but not the Adelaide Plains, then this arrangement could 
impede the capacity of the Board to integrate urban and rural land and 
water use planning. 
The question we have to ask is whether or not implementation of the Bill 
would or could impede the ability of the Board to deliver on its mandate. 
The answer to this question–of course–depends on which parts of the 
proposed Bill is implemented. 
   If the Boundaries chosen coincide with Water Catchment (board 
areas) and Water Catchment Boards remain the prime vehicle for 
planning and implementing the water management plans and 
coordinating decisions about water-affecting activities, then the Bill 
could actually assist the Boards. 
   If Boundaries do not follow those used by the Boards, and another 
layer of plans are developed for each region, then the proposed 
arrangement is likely to impede the capacity of the Board to 
implement the Water Management Plans that have just been 
completed and approved by Parliament. 
The obvious alternative arrangement that is consistent with government 
objectives would be to remove the word ‘Water’ from the Boards’ title 
and instruct them to accept full responsibility for coordinating and, to the 
extent possible, facilitating sustainable NRM in the Water Catchment EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 





(board areas).  Through the evolution of Boards over the next few years, 
people with a broad natural resource background could be appointed and 
provide more depth of experience in soils, natural vegetation, etc. 
Direction of Change 
There has been a strong trend towards urbanisation in the lower 
Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  With the Southern Expressway 
reducing commuting times, densities may increase.  Urbanisation could lead 
to more salinity problems if the water table rises with water usage such as 
lawn watering. 
Forestry has the potential to change aquifer recharge and this is an issue 
under review by the State Government and intergovernmental bodies such 
as the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management 
(SCARM). 
Only the McLaren Vale is a prescribed area within the Onkaparinga 
Catchment (board area).  Arguments could be made for prescribing much 
larger areas, if not the whole Onkaparinga Catchment (board area), in 
order to ensure that water resources are not over-exploited.  As well, 
prescribing will provide greater certainty for people considering 
investments in the Catchment. 
Farm dams are controlled through a permit system in the Mount Lofty 
Ranges Watershed.  Farm dams represent a resource that could be 
brought into a water trading system, if the Board opts to use market 
mechanisms.  This is a topic to be considered in the next report. 
The last section of the report introduces some initial ideas about how to 
move away from minimum standards.  The basic idea is to secure interests 
in water and then provide incentives to innovate and exceed standards.  
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1.1  Purpose of the Report 
This is the first report in a series of three that the Policy and Economic 
Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water will be preparing for the 
Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board.  This report will focus 
on the institutional framework and government policies within the 
Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  The purpose is to: 
   identify potential impediments to best practice in the management of 
the resource; 
   identify potential gaps in the institutional framework as it exists; 
   ensure that our understanding of the framework is sufficient before 
moving forward to consider various incentive mechanisms for water 
management. 
One of the foundations of good economic research is an understanding of 
the institutions.  This report covers the institutions which define the policy 
environment as well as some of the trends and opportunities which may 
emerge.  There are a number of proposed changes to the legislative 
framework and these changes may have implications for the way in which a 
Catchment Water Management Board operates. 
The next report in this series will focus on incentive mechanisms for 
moving natural resource management practices away from minimum 
standards to practices which clearly exceed the minimum.  Options such as 
the role of information, off-sets, water and salinity trading and a specific 
assessment of effective use of water pricing and charging arrangements will 
be considered.   
The third report in this series will be the capstone report which will 
outline the development of an integrated ecosystem modelling and 
assessment system.  Ideally, the model will enable social, economic and 
biophysical interactions to be monitored, progress against objectives to be 
evaluated, and alternatives tested. 
These reports are designed to aid in the next major review of Catchment 
Water Management Plan in the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  The 
Catchment Water Management Plan, approved by Cabinet in December 
2000, is a foundation document.  A major review has to occur within five 
years (December 2005).  Budgets are on a three-year rolling cycle.  Each 
year, an annual review occurs and with this the previous year's budget is 
replaced with a new third year.  Other amendments may be introduced as 
well. INTRODUCTION 
 





The series of reports being prepared by CSIRO will provide an integrated 
approach to addressing the requirements of section 92, 3, (g), (iv) and (vi) 
which require the Board to identify: 
(iv) "methods for improving the quality of water of the 
water resources in the board's Catchment area and the 
health of ecosystems that depend on that water; and … . 
(vi) methods for encouraging sustainable use of water;"1. 
1.2  Description of the Catchment 
The purpose of describing the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area) is to 
identify the potential areas where impediments to best practice are at issue 
or have the potential to be in the future.  A first step is to ensure that sub-
areas of the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area) are described in a 
consistent manner. 
The Onkaparinga Catchment (board area) contains a diversity of economic 
uses of land and water that will continue to be of concern as the area 
develops.  Institutions and institutional arrangements will evolve in 
response to these development pressures.  If we take a snapshot of the 
current situation, this will serve as a reference point.  The consultation 
sub-areas (from the development of the Water Management Plan) will 
serve as a tool for categorisation of the Catchment.  The Onkaparinga 
Catchment (board area) is not homogenous in terms of its economic land 
uses, see Figure 1.1. 
   Upper Catchment (above Mount Bold Reservoir) – this area includes 
the townships of Lobethal, Woodside, Oakbank, Hahndorf, Echunga 
and Stirling.  This area is semi-rural including land uses such as 
viticulture, horticulture, grazing and dairying and hobby farming as 
well as residential land use. 
   Lower Onkaparinga (below Mount Bold Reservoir) – this area 
includes the lower reaches of the Onkaparinga River as well as a 
section of coastline.  It includes the communities of Clarendon, 
Blewitt Springs, Kangarilla, Hackman and Noarlunga. 
   Noarlunga Embayment – this area includes part of the City of Marion 
and the City of Onkaparinga.  These areas are urbanised.  The area 
includes the Happy Valley Reservoir, Christie Creek and Field River. 
   McLaren Vale and Willunga Basin – this area includes the McLaren 
Vale Prescribed Wells Area and a large section of the coastal area 
which comes under the Board’s jurisdiction. 
                                            
1Appendix I contains section 92 of the Water Resources Act 1997 which lists all the 
elements that Catchment Water Management Plans must contain.  INTRODUCTION 
 





Figure 1.1  Consultation Sub–Areas within Catchment 
 
1.2.1  Salinity in the Catchment 
As part of the National Land and Water Resources Audit–Dryland Salinity 
Theme Project I, the condition and trends with respect to salinity have 
been assembled for Catchments across South Australia, including the 
Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  While there are limitations with 
respect to the amount and continuity of data collected, the report 
documented a couple of key indicators for the Catchment.  The situation is 
not dire but warrants attention. Salinisation has occurred with a number of 
stations reporting salt input/output ratios greater than one.  "[T]he data 
show that this stream [the Onkaparinga] has a flow-weighted EC well 
below the Australian drinking water standard, but the high flow volume 
means that salt loads to the reservoir are high" (Jolly et al., 2000, p.48).  INTRODUCTION 
 





The simple observation to make is that salinity levels in some parts of the 
Onkaparinga Catchment (board area) are significantly higher than those in 
the Murray River.  While there may be a slight linear increase in salinity, it 
is not statistically significant. 
The trend in the data may be reflecting the fact that land in the Catchment, 
especially in the Mount Lofty Ranges, has been cleared for many decades 
and we may be seeing the final landscape response to last phases of 
clearing.2  Given the importance of the Mount Lofty Range Watershed to 
the drinking water supply of Adelaide metropolitan area, it is clear that any 
trends will be important to monitor. 
1.2.2  Core Environmental and Water Allocation Issues 
Agriculture and urban development are two of the major forces which 
have modified the Catchment.  As well, Mount Bold within the 
Onkaparinga Catchment (board area), serves as a water collection point 
for Adelaide.  This has resulted in degradation, isolation and fragmentation 
of ecosystems which contribute to a decrease in biodiversity in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  The Catchment in all likelihood 
cannot be restored to pre-European settlement conditions.  However, the 
health of the waterways and dependent ecosystems can be enhanced if the 
needs of the environment are taken into account in the allocation of water 
resources and in the control of water-affecting activities.  The Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Plan sets out a series of core 
environmental strategies that include: 
   rehabilitating and managing watercourses through programs to fence 
riparian zones, clear woody weeds and exotic trees; 
   revegetating degraded areas with local indigenous plant species; 
   maintaining and enhancing the quality of surface and ground waters 
which includes maintaining wetlands. 
A recent initiative is the Board’s proposal not to levy areas of native 
vegetation protected by a heritage agreement and, hence, of high 
biodiversity value. 
                                            
2 Clearing occurred in two phases from approximately 1860-80 and 1930-50. (Jolly et al, 
2000) INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 





2 INSTITUTIONAL  FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Defining  Institutions 
After setting out broad principles about how a society wishes to manage its 
resources, effective public policy needs to be context specific.  In particular, 
public policy prescriptions tend to be more effective when they are 
consistent with the underlying institutional framework.  This sounds nice 
but what do we mean by the term institution?  The term institution can be 
used to describe everything from the Office of the Prime Minister, to a 
Catchment Board, to rules which govern financial transactions. 
Many people interpret institutions to mean only administrative 
arrangements.  This report will use terms such as institutional environment 
or institutional framework to describe the set of fundamental political, 
social and legal ground rules which govern economic and political activity 
(Bromley, 1989).  Institutions are important because when we evaluate a 
given policy and deem it to be "efficient", the statement is only valid for the 
institutional framework being referenced.  If the governing rules are 
changed, then what is viewed as an economically efficient use of resources 
might also change. That is, the framework is one that moves with changes 
in values held by the community. It is an adaptive not a fixed concept. 
Institutions, as defined by governing rules are, in turn, able to shape the 
policy environment through tools or instruments at their disposal and 
thereby change the way in which resources are managed and used.  The 
range of instruments might include: 
   Motivational instruments such as prizes, awards, etc. 
   Information 
   Grants 
   Financial assistance 
   Levies and Charges 
   Regulations. 
Not all these instruments are available to all the governing bodies with an 
interest in natural resource management.  The Commonwealth 
Constitution says very little about water resources and thus jurisdiction 
resides largely with the State and Territorial Governments.
3  The 
Commonwealth Government can participate in water resource 
management through financial incentives.  However, the incentives must 
                                            
3 The Commonwealth is responsible for international agreements that may relate to water 
resources. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 





not be shown to discriminate between States under the cooperative 
federalism framework.  The Commonwealth Government as a first layer of 
government often takes a coordinating role.  The mechanisms it uses tend 
to become more refined when delivered in partnership with States and 
agencies. 
The State Government as a second layer has the power to put together 
packages of legislation and regulation to manage water, land and resources.  
In South Australia through the Water Resources Act 1997, Catchment Water 
Management Boards are a third layer of government which put together 
plans to manage the resource.  The final layer is Local Government which 
assembles the Development Plans for Council areas.  The Catchment 
Water Management Boards have the ability to request changes to 
Development Plans and thus in the hierarchy of governance, Catchment 
Water Management Boards are a third layer and local Councils a fourth 
layer. 
These layers are interconnected largely through fiscal arrangements but 
also regulatory authority.  However, one of the interesting features of this 
report will be to consider some of the proposed changes in the 
institutional framework and follow the potential evolutionary path that 
various layers of government might end up taking. Cooperative 
arrangements between Catchment Boards, Local Government, etc, can be 
used to collapse the third and fourth levels into one. 
2.2  Defining the Institutional Framework 
There are probably three current pieces of South Australian legislation, 
which are critical to the management of the Catchment, namely the Water 
Resources Act 1977, Development Act 1993 and the Environment Protection Act 
1993.  The primary piece of legislation is, of course, the Water Resources 
Act 1997.  Responsibility resides with the Minister for Water Resources 
and administration and enforcement of the Water Resources Act 1997 is 
carried out by the Department for Water Resources.  Land development 
and land use is covered by the Development Act 1993 through the Minister 
of Transport and Planning.  Land use can have an immediate impact on 
ground and surface water or have slow moving effects over time.  For this 
reason, Regional Planning Strategies and Development Plans of Councils 
often contain a number of requirements to protect the water resources of 
the area.  However, Councils are concerned with a wide variety of social, 
historical and cultural issues including economic development which may 
sometimes over-ride the concern for one resource. The final piece of 
legislation, the Environment Protection Act 1993, allows for the 
Environmental Protection Agency to issue protection policies on various 
environmental quality issues.  Other legislation that are of some relevance 
include the Native Vegetation Act 1991 and the Soil Conservation and Land 
Care Act 1989. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 





The Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board, as established 
under the Water Resources Act 1997, is concerned with managing a crucial 
resource, water, and water-affecting activities.  Rivers, tributaries and 
groundwater aquifers are unfortunately oblivious to the boundaries created 
by people and refuse to be contained within only one.  If the resource 
won't stay within a jurisdiction, efforts to coordinate various levels of 
government are required.  
The Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board contains five local 
Councils: the City of Marion, City of Onkaparinga, Adelaide Hills Council 
and the District Councils of Mount Barker and Yankalilla.  Figure 2.1 
outlines the current boundaries of the Councils. 
Figure 2.1  Local Council Boundaries 
 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 





The Adelaide Hills Council is the product of amalgamating previously 
existing Councils, namely DC Stirling, Onkaparinga, Gumeracha and East 
Torrens.  The City of Onkaparinga Council is the product of an 
amalgamation of the Cities of Happy Valley, Noarlunga and part of the DC 
of Willunga.  The present structure reduces the number of jurisdictions 
which have interests in the Catchment.  Councils by their nature are 
concerned with a broad number of social, economic, planning issues within 
their jurisdictions.  This means everything from delivering library services, 
catching dogs to development planning. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
DO THE VARIOUS ACTS OVERLAP AND COINCIDE? 
 





3  WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE 
ONKAPARINGA—HOW DO THE VARIOUS ACTS 
OVERLAP AND COINCIDE? 
Legislation defines how economic resources within society will be 
organised.  There can be differences between what is written on paper and 
what is actually enforced.  A host of interesting questions emerge.  As we 
analyse the state of affairs from the Catchment level, we can consider what 
the relevant parts of the Act mean relative to a set of criteria.  How an Act 
or Policy performs on individual criteria can be viewed as a clean way of 
untangling the different threads.  The criteria might include things like: 
   enhancing economic efficiency, 
    increasing fairness, 
   improving water quality and maintaining the quantity of water for 
consumptive purposes. 
Terms like fairness need to be defined.  For an economist, there are two 
main definitions of fairness used - Pareto fairness and Rawlsian fairness.  
With Pareto fairness, we might think about whether a potential change 
would increase income such that "winners" would be in the position to 
compensate "losers".  One then needs to consider whether or not this 
compensation should then be paid.  Rawlsian fairness requires that the 
changes make the least in society no worse off. 
3.1  Water Resources Act 1997 
The Water Resources Act 1997 has removed many of the impediments to 
best practice through the separation of title to land and to water.  This has 
allowed extensive trading in water throughout the State.  Very little trade 
has occurred in the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area). 
There are some remaining practical administrative items that remain 
impediments to best practice.  These items do not relate to the legislation 
itself but are part of the practical implementation of the separation of title 
to land and water.  In another study, Young et al (2000) noted that the title 
registration system for water needs to move towards a Torrens title 
system to ensure that interests are registered clearly against title and 
transfers cannot be rorted. 
The Water Resources Act 1997 has put more power into the hands of the 
community to manage the water resources within a Catchment.
4  Through 
                                            
4 The level of participation depends on how involved the community wishes to become.  
The reasons for becoming involved vary across the Catchment (board area). WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
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sections 53, 54 and 59, the Minister is able to search for people with a 
wide variety of experience, skills and expertise to come together as a 
Catchment Water Management Board.  The Board is charged with putting 
together a Catchment Water Management Plan and Water Allocation 
Plans.  These Plans are put together through community consultation and 
expertise of consultants, Board staff and the Board members.  The Plans 
then proceed to the Minister for Water Resources and through a process 
of review and revision, become statutory documents.  The fact that the 
Plans become statutory documents gives the process teeth and meaning.  
The Plans are not simply an expression of community aspirations. 
The Water Resources Act 1997 has provisions under Section 12 which 
allows for “one-stop shopping” and was described as one of the good news 
sections of the legislation designed to streamline processes.  If a person has 
an authorisation under the Development Act, Native Vegetation Act or other 
natural resource management legislation to do an activity, then the person 
is not required to obtain a permit under the Water Resources Act.  This has 
some interesting implications if we consider an example: 
Example 1  Land-clearing in Rural Areas 
Let's consider a person with a parcel of land in the upper 
Catchment.  Let's assume that the land is currently zoned 
for rural land use and currently has native vegetation on it.  
If the person wants to clear the land for agricultural use and 
has clearance under the Native Vegetation Act, the person 
would not need  to seek permission from the Department 
for Water Resources for a Section 9 water-affecting 
activity.5  Land clearing would be at odds with the current 
strategy within the Catchment to revegetate degraded areas 
or to use natural regeneration methods where remnant 
vegetation exists.  Further, there is no obligation for the 
Native Vegetation Council to consult with Catchment 
Water Management Boards on vegetation clearance. 
If the Board wants to influence a water-affecting activity being approved 
elsewhere, it must and is given the powers to change the decision making 
process, but not an individual decision. This is efficient and avoids 
duplication. 
                                            
5 This however, does not mean that a person could argue that they should necessarily 
receive a water allocation if the area was prescribed. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
DO THE VARIOUS ACTS OVERLAP AND COINCIDE? 
 





3.2  The Development Act 1993 
The Development Plans of the Councils all set out various provisions to 
protect the watershed.6  For instance, the Development Plan for the City 
of Marion restricts land uses that are not primarily agricultural in Rural 
Zone B, around Field River and its tributaries, that would detract from its 
character and function.7  However, outside Rural Zone B, Field River 
enters an existing residential area, the Plan allows for residential housing of 
various allotment sizes to come within 30 metres of the River. 
The provisions of the Development Plans are minimum standards which 
are designed to help preserve the waterways through the Catchment.
8  If 
the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board was to perceive 
there to be a serious deficiency in the Development Plans, or provisions 
which are at odds with the Water Catchment Management Plan, the Board 
could request the Minister for Water Resources to put a request to the 
Minister for Transportation and Urban Planning that an amendment be 
made to the Development Plan of the Council in question.  This would be a 
rather heavy-handed gesture and would indicate that communication 
between the Board and the Council was largely failing to reach satisfactory 
results.  There are a couple of strategies that could be considered.  
Co-operative Strategy—Across the State, Catchment Water Management 
Boards and local Councils have been working along side one another.  
Depending on circumstances, there may be considerable room for Boards 
and Councils to develop policies on how amendments to Development 
Plans will be made.  These policies could then be circulated to the 
Department for Water Resources and Planning SA.  Only where Boards 
and Councils fail to come to agreement, would the respective Departments 
be called in to help negotiate solutions.  The advantage of a cooperative 
approach is that it builds on local solutions and expertise.  The 
disadvantage is that solutions may not be consistent across the State.  The 
arrangement is not considered to be an impediment.  It provides a positive 
incentive for differing administrative bodies to cooperate and, hence, is 
likely to be efficient.  Moreover, it forces the policy signals provided to 
investors to remain consistent across the Councils in a particular 
Catchment. 
                                            
6  There is considerable potential for overlap and differences in goals and objectives 
between the Development Plans of the Councils and the Water Management Plan of the 
Onkaparinga.  A review of the Development Plans is being conducted by Stephen Smith, 
Strategic Planner with the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board.   For this 
reason, the aim of this report will be to highlight broad principles. 
7 Marion (City) Development Plan.  Consolidated February 8, 2001.  p. 152 
8 Floodplain management strategies are currently under review. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
DO THE VARIOUS ACTS OVERLAP AND COINCIDE? 
 





Legislative Approach—Amendments to legislation may be required to 
obtain a consistent approach across the State.  This approach will yield a 
solution though it may or may not take as much time as Boards and 
Councils negotiating solutions.  Further, the State Government may be 
seen as imposing a process. 
Example 2  Compliant land use in a Prescribed Wells Area 
The linkages between the Development Plans in effect 
across the Catchment and the Water Management Plan and 
Water Allocation Plan of the Onkaparinga Catchment 
(board area) may not be as well defined as perhaps an 
individual contemplating a development might wish.   
However, it is the responsibility of the entrepreneur 
considering a development, such as a boutique winery, to 
ensure that all approvals and licensing requirements are 
met.  Some consideration could be given to amending 
policies, procedures and Development Plans to alert the 
entrepreneur to the fact that compliance in terms of land 
use is not a necessary and sufficient condition.  The 
McLaren Vale Water Allocation Plan sets out some 
stringent rules for transferring water within the Prescribed 
Wells Area.  The intent of the rules is to ensure that 
transfers do not result in further stress on the aquifer or 
increase soil salinity.  Establishing the right to extract water 
in this area is likely to be the most important element in a 
business plan and would presumably be the starting point 
for an entrepreneur. 
In considering the Development Act 1993, there are some significant 
impediments as well as trade-offs among these criteria. 
   Economic efficiency is impaired by the high cost of gathering 
information for individuals considering investments or land use 
changes.  Some of this cost is unavoidable in protecting the varied 
interests of society. 
   The Development Plans tend to focus on minimum standards.  For 
example, Development Plans could include strong energy and water 
efficiency requirements starting with how new houses are to be 
situated on a site.  Moving above minimum building standards as 
required by the Australian Building Code tends to decrease 
affordability.  Fairness, in either a Pareto or Rawlsian sense, is 
impaired.  Access to resources is not improved as the process of 
development approvals is weighted towards those with information. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
DO THE VARIOUS ACTS OVERLAP AND COINCIDE? 
 





   Development Plans do not generally protect or enhance water quality 
because of the incremental nature of planning approvals.  Salinity may 
be increasing with urbanisation where irrigation is used extensively on 
landscaping. 
   The protection measures of the Water Resources Act and the 
Development Act should ideally protect the quality and quantity of 
water available.  However, the speed of economic change may place 
the resource under pressure.9 
3.3  The Regional Planning Process 
The Mount Lofty Ranges Regional Strategy Plan is a forward looking 
document released in 1993.  The document still has relevance almost a 
decade later because many of the issues remain the same.  The document 
seeks to set out principles and a process for protecting the resources and 
agricultural nature of the Mount Lofty Ranges.  The strategy is designed to 
strike a balance between economic development of the region, the urban 
development and the environment generally.  Contained within the 
document is a set of policies and procedures which are focussed on 
protecting surface and groundwater resources in the region.  The challenge 
is not to change the administrative arrangements but rather to find ways to 
implement and enforce these policies. 
The Regional Strategy is concerned with the quantity of water resources 
for the area and recognises the importance of protecting the quality of 
Adelaide’s supply of drinking water.  In a number of instances, the Regional 
Strategy suggests that development be curtailed where the land use will 
affect the Mount Lofty Ranges watershed or sensitive coastal areas.  
The Regional Strategy advocates the development of methodologies for 
assessing the cumulative impact of past decisions.  Planning approval by its 
nature can take on an incremental view in that a project is assessed for its 
consistency with the relevant planning documents.  The process is repeated 
one project at a time.  If decisions are not periodically reviewed and 
evaluated as a whole then the process can lead to long-term degradation of 
resources. 
The Regional Strategy predates the Onkaparinga Catchment Water 
Management Board and the statutory planning process of the Water 
Management Plan.  The spirit of the Regional Strategy can be seen in the 
Development Plans of the Councils, such as the Adelaide Hills Council 
Development Plan.  The Development Plan of the Councils needs to be 
consistent with the Regional Strategy and the State Planning Strategy. 
                                            
9 This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4–The direction of change. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
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However, the Regional Strategy is plagued by competing objectives without 
a clear set of overriding priorities.  This is a problem common to many 
planning documents—how to sort out shifting and competing priorities and 
make trade offs among them.  As well, documents of this kind also suffer 
from the degree of separation from the political decision making process.   
The Regional Strategy was approved for public release but is not a 
statutory document.  Thus, decision makers can opt for increasing 
economic development through, say, tourism and wineries where the 
incremental effect of one more project is likely to be small.  One way of 
overcoming this impediment—as indicated in the National Action Plan for 
Salinity and Water Quality—is to set targets and then use a suite of policy 
incentives to keep water-affecting activities and land use activities within 
the domain defined by the standards set. 
It is difficult to evaluate the Mount Lofty Ranges Regional Strategy Plan 
against the criteria.  Unfortunately, there is a significant difference between 
what the Plan set outs to achieve, which is a very good set of ideals, and 
what it actually delivers, which is very little. 
In considering the Regional Strategy, some trade-offs between the criteria 
emerge: 
   Economic efficiency is not enhanced by the Strategy because it ends 
up being a soft guiding document. 
   Access to resources is not improved as the process of development 
approvals is weighted towards those with information. Fairness in 
either a Pareto or Rawlsian sense is not improved. 
   If the Regional Strategy had teeth then it might be better able to 
protect or enhance water quality in the region if the cumulative effect 
of planning decisions was periodically reviewed.  Similarly, the 
quantity of water available would likely stay relatively constant if the 
Regional Strategy had teeth. 
In summary, the prime impediment is the region lacks the clear articulation 
of a set of water quality and water-affecting practice standards and targets. 
3.4  The Integrated Natural Resource Management Bill 
2001 
A draft Integrated Natural Resource Management (INRM) Bill is currently 
being circulated for public consultation.  The bill, if and when it is passed, is 
intended to provide over-arching legislation to integrate natural resource 
management in the State.  The draft is an exposure draft and is undergoing 
a process of wide consultation.  As a result, it is likely that it could be 
changed significantly. WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
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There are already a number of community-based bodies managing aspects 
of resource management in the State, including Soil Conservation Boards, 
Catchment Water Management Boards, National Parks and Wildlife Act 
consultative committees.  The bill is intended to bring about greater 
coordination of these entities.  It is said to be consistent with the State 
Government's policy of "eliminating duplication and maintaining, 
administration and planning in natural resources management".10 
Under the proposed legislation, a Ministerial Board will be established and 
the Ministerial Board may designate an area of the State as an Integrated 
Natural Resource Management (INRM) Region.  The boundaries of the 
Region may or may not correspond to current Water Catchment (board 
area) boundaries.  The Ministerial Board will establish an INRM group for 
each region.  As an interim measure, the boundaries used for the Natural 
Heritage Trust administration will be used.  These boundaries do not align 
with existing Water Catchment board areas. 
One of the important tasks of the proposed INRM groups is tackle the 
problems identified in the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water 
Quality.  The explanatory paper suggests that existing bodies do not have 
“necessary status and resources to undertake the functions required by the 
National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality.”11  Section 92, 3 of the 
Water Resources Act 1997 sets out the elements of the Catchment Water 
Management Plan that deal with ecosystem health.  Not many ecosystems 
could be described as not being dependent on water.  Thus, salinity 
management and water quality are part of the core business of the 
Catchment Water Management Boards.  We would argue that the Boards 
represent an avenue for delivering a coordinated approach.
12 
The proposed legislation presents a number of difficult issues.  It is not 
apparent how the INRM legislation will fit with existing legislation such as 
the Development Act 1993 and the Environment Protection Act 1993.  The 
legislation as it currently stands may not include all aspects of resource 
utilisation such as mining and development of heavy industry.13  In terms of 
ability to act under the current bill INRM may only have power to contract 
and distribute grants. 
                                            
10 Draft Integrated Natural Resource Management Bill:  Request for Comments & 
Explanatory Paper, p.2 
11 Ibid p.4 
12 If it is determined that the boundaries of the current Boards were too small, then it may 
be worthwhile having them "bunch up" for the purposes of the National Action Plan.  
There is likely to be sufficient level of good will among the Boards for this to work. 
13 Mining and its effects on water courses is covered by the proposed Environment 
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The basic premise of the proposed legislation, to enhance coordination of 
all aspects of natural resource management, is certainly on the mark.  
Under one model, the groups will act solely as a loose coordinating forum 
and assist the boards to negotiate change.  Alternatively, the INRM groups 
could end-up serving as yet another layer of government or bureaucracy.  
Is this latter configuration the right approach?  Table 3.1 outlines the aims 
of the Bill and considers how the Bill compares with the government 
objectives stated above. 
Table 3.1  Comparison of the INRM Bill to Government Objectives 
Aim   Proposal 
Eliminate Duplication  Adds another administrative structure 
with local representation and contracting 
powers 
Rationalise Legislation  Expands legislation without removing 
restricting powers from other legislation 
Rationalise Administration  Adds a fifth level of government to the 
current four tiers concerned with natural 
resource management. 
Rationalise Planning  Planning SA and the Minister for 
Transport and Urban Planning not 
included. 
 
The Catchment Water Management Boards, the State Water Plan, Council 
Development Plans, Soil Conservation Boards are all on their own planning 
cycles.  If another layer of government is introduced with yet another 
planning cycle, there may be increased difficulty of getting all these planning 
processes to line up.  There is considerable potential for constraining the 
process to where it is very difficult to make decisions.  
Across the State the development of Catchment Water Management Plans 
have formed part of a process of building capacity within communities in 
order to be in the position to manage resources.  In some Catchments, 
there may be considerably more appetite for participation in resource 
management and it is just a matter of investigating this potential. The 
obvious next step for strong, dynamic Catchment Water Management 
Boards is to widen the planning process to take full account of all the 
natural resource management issues. 
Currently responsibility for soils resides with Primary Industries, Resources 
South Australia, water with the Department for Water Resources, and the 
remaining issues with the environment with Department of Environment 
and Heritage.  Is there a need for yet another body to manage natural 
resources?  Should there be one department responsible for all natural WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
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resources or is it a matter of better coordination between arms of 
government that is actually required?  Is there an alternative model such 
that a larger role for resource management can be assigned to Catchment 
Water Management Boards or Soil Conservation Boards, if there is the 
capacity to take on a larger role?  The answers to these questions are not 
readily apparent but for resource management to be cohesive some tough 
choices have to be made and the resources put behind one of these 
resource management models. 
If this legislation goes forward, there will be a real need for administrative 
partnerships between the government agencies, in particular, synchronised 
planning cycles.  The Catchment Water Management Boards and the 
Department of Water Resources are currently on five year planning cycles.  
If the INRM legislation is to bring all planning cycles into line, it could be 
effective.  If the INRM cycle adds one more planning cycle to the existing 
cycles, then the INRM may introduce new rigidities into the policy 
environment. 
In considering the INRM bill, there are some significant impediments that 
need to be considered.  However, much of this analysis is going to hinge on 
how the INRM bill evolves. 
   Economic efficiency will be impaired if the INRM groups become 
another layer of government; 
   If the INRM bill results in more rigidities then the ability of any one 
body to act will be fully restricted and, water resource quality may 
decline further; 
   Access to resources is not likely to be improved as the INRM process 
has no social mandate to promote equity; 
   There is a risk that the INRM groups will siphon resources away from 
Catchment Water Management Boards and compromise their ability 
to manage change. 
3.5  Environment Protection (Water Quality) Policy 
This last section brings an important area into the discussion namely the 
role of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA).  The EPA is not 
another layer of government but a point of coordination.  The EPA has 
issued a draft policy statement on Water Quality which is of relevance to 
the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board. 
An Environment Protection Policy is one of the main legislative tools 
provided for by the Environment Protection Act 1993.  As part of the 
management and control of point source pollution, Environment 
Protection Policy Protection Policy states as a general obligation that: WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE ONKAPARINGA—HOW 
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"11.  (1) A person who undertakes to avoid need to discharge 
waste into waters – 
(a) must take all reasonable and practicable measures that 
themselves cause environmental harm) to avoid the 
need to discharge the waste into any water; and 
(b) in taking those measures, must have regard to the 
waste management hierarchy. 
(2)  Examples of the measures that could be taken are – 
(a) cleaner production; or 
(b) recycling or reusing the waste; or 
(c) subject to this policy, discharging the waste onto land." 
The draft policy appears to set very high standards for how pollution will 
be discharged into waterways but may be inadequate with respect to 
groundwater.  The full impact of this policy will come down to the 
interpretation of "practical measures" and whether the economics of 
retooling production, or introducing new technologies will enter what is 
deemed practical. 
Groundwater presumably falls under section 11 and some of the 
protections in sections 18 and 19 and sections 22 to 39 may be inadequate 
with respect to certain activities.  Irrigation of reclaimed water onto land 
(section 11 (2) (c)) and subsequent leaching of residual contaminants may 
create serious problems without adequate monitoring.  However, in some 
instances, the standards may be overly difficult to achieve.  The draft Policy 
requires that all groundwaters in South Australia be protected to drinking 
water standards and this standard will act as a default across the State.  
The policy does not differentiate by the existing background quality of the 
groundwater.
14  Where, for example, an aquifer is naturally saline a more 
efficient policy would be one that allowed discharge in a manner that does 
not diminish aquifer quality.  While the draft Environment Protection Policy 
allows for communities to amend the default policy, it would be a long and 
arduous process to change these defaults. 
As will be discussed in the fifth section of this report and in the next report 
for the Board, there may be push and pull mechanisms which can drive the 
same sort of outcomes that allow agents in the regional economy more 
freedom of choice in how measures will be implemented.  
In considering the Environmental Protection Policy, there are some 
significant impediments that need to be considered.  However, much of this 
                                            
14 Submission by Peter Dillon on the SA Draft Environment Protection Policy (Water 
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analysis is going to hinge on how "practical measures" ends up being 
defined. 
   There are often more efficient means of reaching the same outcomes 
by working with the market to move in the desired direction. 
   Requirements to protect all groundwater to drinking water standards 
regardless of background water quality may result in aquifer recharge 
and storage becoming much more expensive. 
   Access to resources is not likely to be improved as the policy has no 
social mandate to promote equity. 
   The quality of available water of groundwater in the Catchment may 
be at risk from some activities such as irrigating with reclaimed water. THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE 
 





4  THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE 
In the previous section, we have discussed legislation, proposed bills and 
draft policies which are shaping the institutional environment faced by the 
Board.  This is only one part of the picture.  There are distinct 
development pressures in the Catchment which will shape land use and the 
demand for water.  There is the potential for greater urbanisation, 
decrease in grazing/dairying and movement towards more horticulture, 
tourism and wineries, etc. 
4.1 Urban  Development 
In the lower Catchment, particularly the Willunga Basin and the McLaren 
Vale, there is increased urban development as construction of the 
Southern Expressway reduces commuting times to the Adelaide 
metropolitan area.  As well, there are the amenity values associated with 
the beaches and the wineries of the area.  Urban development has the 
effect of concentrating population densities and increasing water 
consumption over previous agricultural uses of water.  As well, urban 
development changes how aquifer recharge occurs.  As bitumen is laid, 
homes are constructed, and commercial areas are developed, a smaller 
percentage of rain actually permeates the soil and enters the groundwater.  
A higher percentage must run off as stormwater.  Stormwater tends to be 
captured and swept away and in some areas directed away to the ocean.  
However, if the density of the new suburb is low and the landscaping 
requires irrigation through the summer period, then the amount of water 
reaching the water table can be quite high in comparison to a previous land 
use such as pasture. 
The potential for Aquifer Storage and Recharge (ASR) is being explored in 
the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area).  A demonstration project is in 
place and the possibility of a larger scale research initiative is under 
consideration. 
The Minister for Water Resources and his Department, the water industry 
and CSIRO have been discussing the possibility of reducing Adelaide's 
dependence on the Murray River by making urban water use more 
efficient.  To "free up" River Murray water for larger environmental flows, 
strategies such as water conservation, water recycling and alternative 
water sources (perhaps more water from the Mount Lofty Ranges 
watershed) become the main options.  A question to ask at this point, 
where would water be put to its best use locally or regionally?  How would 
the benefits be shared if more water was extracted from the Mount Lofty 
Area for Adelaide? THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE 
 






Wide scale forestry plantations are being proposed for the Adelaide Hills.   
Under the Farm Forestry Incentive Scheme, incentive payments of up to 
$375 per hectare are available to landowners.  Preference is given to sites 
which are greater than 10 ha and receive over 600 mm of annual rainfall 
with potential to extend to neighbouring properties.15  The program is part 
of a strategy to make Australia self-sufficient in wood products and 
potentially a net exporter.16  It is an example of the effect of a current 
policy signal which for an efficient outcome needs to be guided by local and 
Catchment planning processes. 
Currently, the Water Resources Act 1997 may not be adequate to deal with 
reducing recharge to groundwater brought about by a significant long-term 
land use change due to plantation forestry.  It may be possible that 
neighbouring properties could take civil action where it is believed that 
recharge and draw-down were at issue.  However, the data collection and 
onus of proof are likely to be beyond the means of most neighbours.  The 
forestry issue is important if the water balance for the Mount Lofty area 
and the Adelaide metropolitan area is viewed from a regional sense.  
Changes in land use from pasture to forestry or vice versa are significant 
water-affecting activities. 
Issues around forestry and recharge were identified by the Select 
Committee on Water Allocations in the South East. The Minister for 
Water Resources has been considering policy options and has 
foreshadowed amendments to the Water Resources Act 1997 in his 
statement to the Parliament on this matter on 30 November 2000.  The 
Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management (SCARM) 
is considering the policy implications of land use change as an agenda paper.  
SCARM has requested the High Level Steering Group on Water to prepare 
a discussion document for the next meeting in Darwin, August 2001.
17  
Young and Hatton MacDonald (2000) in reviewing options for the South 
East suggested that significant changes in land use that affect recharge such 
as forestry be required to have a water licence with a holding allocation.18 
                                            
15 Other conditions apply to the scheme, see Mount Lofty Ranges & Fleurieu Peninsula 
Farm Forestry Program Information Sheet. 
16 Using a subsidy to establish an exporting industry runs the risk of significant problems 
under current international trade rules, such as the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT). 
17 Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management, Agenda Paper, Item 
1.1.4, Wellington, March 7, 2001. 
18 See http://www.clw.csiro.au/research/agriculture/economic/publications.html THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE 
 





For the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area), there are two unknowns.  
First, how many hectares will be planted with what species? Depending on 
the species planted (Tasmanian blue gum, Sydney blue gum, spotted gum, 
sugar gum, radiata pine, etc.) and intended use (woodchips, firewood, 
sawlogs), recharge may be affected for 10, 20 or 25 to 35 years.  Second, 
how will the State Government choose to deal with recharge affecting 
activities?  The State Government faces considerable opposition from a 
vocal group in the South East who believe that landowners have a right to 
the rain that falls on their land, irrespective of the effect their activities 
might have on recharge.  The issue is important as in any fully allocated 
region whenever land use changes water yield, allocation must also be 
changed.  If this is not done, ultimately the rate of use is likely to be 
unsustainable. 
4.3  Areas within Catchment not Prescribed 
Within the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area), only the McLaren Vale 
Prescribed Wells Area is in fact prescribed under provisions of the Water 
Resources Act 1997.  The area relies on groundwater and reticulated water 
provided by SA Water for viticulture and other primary production 
activity.  The groundwater resources could easily be over-exploited 
without these firm allocation arrangements. 
There is the potential for other areas within the Catchment to come under 
pressure with the growing number of horticulturist and viticulturists 
moving into profitable enterprises that require water.  Without careful 
collection and monitoring of data on ground and surface water resources, 
there is a danger that pressure will be put on areas not currently 
prescribed.  This is the reason that the Board has initiated surface and 
ground water monitoring programs.  Without monitoring, surprises can 
occur as over-exploitation of the resource can occur quite quickly.  
However, the decision to prescribe the entire water Catchment (board 
area) lies with the Minister. 
The state of the art in such circumstances is to provide early and strong 
signals as to the direction and timing of policy change so that investment 
remains efficient and over development does not occur.  Clarification of 
the rules on how water will be used in the region that acknowledges the 
interaction between ground and surface water in the watershed and the 
relationship between the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area) and the 
Adelaide metropolitan region is a necessary precondition.  Even if the 
resources are not stressed today, the fundamentals can be laid out 
correctly now so that everyone knows the rules for the next round of play. 
Another consideration is the value that well-defined property rights confer 
to property owners.  Even if not all the water is allocated immediately, THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE 
 





uncertainty is reduced.  By prescribing the area and formally setting out 
rights to water through water licences and allocations, property owners 
will be in the position to transfer water according to well-defined rules 
once all the water is allocated.  The rules are clear and opportunities 
transparent. 
4.4 Farm  Dams 
Farm dams throughout the watershed are now controlled by permit 
system through the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board.  
For areas other than the Mount Lofty Ranges watershed or a prescribed 
area in the Onkaparinga Catchment (board area), a farm dam that is 
considered a development would be assessed on merit.  Conceivably, a 
dam is likely to be approved if the land use is consistent with the 
Development Plan.  There are some "loop-holes" because under the 
Development Act 1993, a farm dam is not a development if the walls are 
under 3 metres and the dam is under 5 megalitres capacity.  This type of 
rule encourages shallow dams and this may not be the most efficient means 
of storing water.  The State of Queensland has been receiving a great deal 
of negative national attention for this type of dam building occurring. 
Farms in the watershed area are allowed to store up to 50% of the run-off 
that occurs on their property provided that water quality and quantity are 
maintained and the dam is not in an ecologically sensitive area or subject to 
erosion.  As well, the capacity of any existing dams on the property has to 
be taken into consideration to ensure that total capacity will be under the 
50% rule.  This rule may be revised if the environmental flow study provide 
evidence supports setting the rule otherwise.
19  An interesting option to 
consider is the introduction of agreements to enable individual landholders 
to reduce capacity and contract to stay, for example, 20% under whatever 
current rules require for X years and receive a catchment levy rebate. 
In the next report, one of the topics that will be taken is how farm dams 
can be brought into a system of managing water quantity and quality 
through the Catchment.  There may be merit in using market solutions 
such as water trading with appropriate safeguards in place to encourage 
efficient use of water.  Water in shallow dams might be deemed too 
valuable to evaporate. 
                                            
19The 50% rule was put in place until scientific information was assembled about what the 
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5  MOVING BEYOND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
The State of South Australia is doing many things that are consistent with 
best practice.  First, the State, through its Catchment Water Management 
Boards, has been at the forefront in Australia with respect to developing 
Plans that set out the standards for how water resources will be managed.  
These Plans are consistent with the State Plan. 
Second, the Department for Water Resources is moving into pro-active 
problem solving mode by moving to clarify the rules.  An example 
discussed in another section of this report is the review of recharge-
affecting activities, such as forestry.  The level of activity could not have 
been anticipated in the drafting of the Water Resources Act 1997. 
Third, the Department has moved to improve enforcement by hiring more 
people to investigate water use.  This improves the ability of the 
Department to stand behind the rules. 
In an environment where Catchments have put in place their Management 
Plans and the State has put in place the fundamental building blocks with 
the Water Resources Act 1997 and the accompanying body of regulations, 
there is an opportunity to put in place mechanisms to move beyond 
minimum standards.  Figure 5.1 depicts how environmental standards could 
evolve over time.  Negative signals or penalties could be augmented to 
ensure there is no “back-sliding” but positive signals are used to encourage 
individuals and firms to invest, innovate and achieve a standard of 
performance that is over and above the minimum.  The next report will 
begin to outline these concepts in greater detail and introduce a portfolio 
of mechanisms that have the potential for directing change. 
At this point, however, we note that without access to revenue streams 
likely to become available through extensions of the National Heritage 
Trust or through the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, 
the capacity of the Board to send positive signals to water users and those 
whose actions affect water will be limited. MOVING BEYOND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
 














5.1 Negative  Signals 
5.1.1  Penalties for Cheating 
The Department has moved to enhance the enforcement of rules by hiring 
more people to investigate water licensing.  This improves the ability of the 
Department to stand behind the rules and gives the Catchment Water 
Management Boards more confidence in the process.  Water is valuable in 
this State and the system depends on compliance with allocation rules.  
Widespread “cheating” on allocations would severely undermine the 
system and lead to further degradation of the resource. 
Penalties for exceeding one’s allocation (without purchasing temporary 
water) are declared by the Minister.  Penalty arrangements have been 
applied in several prescribed areas (River Murray, Northern Adelaide 
Plains, Barossa and Angas Bremer).  If penalties are to have meaning, the 
penalties need to be set at a level which has the potential to alter 
behaviour.  For instance, if a penalty is set too low, it may be worthwhile 
to exceed the allocation and pay the penalty, rather than enter the 
temporary or permanent markets for water.   
The Department for Water Resources is currently reviewing the penalty 
structure.  Options being considered include variety of penalties such as a 
flat rate penalty, a stepped penalty and a linear progressive rate based on 
percent excess.  The Department does not support even temporary MOVING BEYOND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
 





reductions in allocations, as it believes that it may seriously affect viability 
of some operations.
20 
Monitoring and enforcement is expensive and any government agency with 
this responsibility is faced with balancing the cost of enforcement with the 
cost of cheating.  This is the case for Department for Water Resources, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Primary Industries, Resources South 
Australia and Planning SA.  However, as development pressure within the 
Catchment increases, the cumulative effect of minor infractions of rules 
may prove large.21 
5.2 Positive  Signals 
5.2.1  Securing Property Rights 
Economic thinking continues to support using the market, where 
appropriate, to move towards social and environmental goals.
22  One of the 
keys to getting private interests to work in the same direction as societal 
interests is to ensure that the underlying property rights are fully specified. 
Within the McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells Area, water is an incredibly 
important and valuable asset.  To secure interests in this asset, there needs 
to be a significant improvement in the paper trail of records.  At present, 
South Australia has an old water registration system.  South Australia, the 
home of the Torrens Title registration system, is a world leader in the 
development of “new system” registration arrangements.  Under the 
Torrens Title system, titles are registered centrally and any dealing 
associated with these titles is valid only when the dealing is recorded on 
that central register.  The Department for Water Resources is moving 
towards such a system but it is not yet fully in place.  Transition to a full 
Torrens Title-like registration system has yet to occur. 
At present, there is considerable mismatch between the procedures used 
to buy and sell land and those used to buy and sell water.  Dealing and 
settlement arrangements for all trades associated with permanent water 
trading need to be made consistent with established conveyancing practices 
                                            
20 Harsh penalties may put pressure on the Board to consider revising rules regarding 
trading arrangements.  Young and Hatton MacDonald (2000) in a report entitled "Who 
Dares Wins" have set out some ideas about how to allow trade while maintaining 
environmental standards. 
21 There is a growing literature within the field of environmental economics on what is 
known as optimal enforcement.  A great deal of thinking has been put into designing 
incentives to get economic agents in a market to report truthfully and to behave in the 
right way so as to reduce monitoring costs. 
22 This does not mean that standards are not enforced. MOVING BEYOND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
 





as quickly as possible.  There remain a number of opportunities for 
strengthening the approach to managing water.  The opportunities reside 
with encouraging movements away from minimum standards, reducing the 
cost of transfers and separating volumetric rights from use rights.  The lack 
of such arrangements impedes opportunities to develop the region’s water 
resources and to reduce administrative costs. 
Another form of positive signals might include the selective waiving of 
levies, charges and rebates to reward behaviour.  Environmental 
accreditation schemes can also be used to achieve this end. 
5.3  Managing for Water and Environmental Quality 
throughout the Catchment 
The Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board has been working 
with a number of agencies to compile large detailed datasets concerning 
ground and surface water systems within the Catchment.  Ongoing 
development of these datasets will provide key information on the health 
of the Catchment and present critical benchmarks for evaluation of 
progress towards goals and objectives. 
For natural resource management to effectively achieve goals, scientific 
research programs need to reflect the important policy issues in the 
questions that are asked.  The health of the Catchment requires a broad 
perspective.  If researchers are not cognisant of the various economic and 
social forces, then they will miss the opportunity to harness or mitigate 
these forces and fail to achieve the desired ends. 
These are not easy straight forward objectives but they start one thinking 
about the difficult choices that emerge when thinking about the health of 
the Catchment and water dependent ecosystems.  Examples from SA 
Water will illustrate some of the trade-offs.  SA Water uses the 
Onkaparinga River as an aqueduct to transfer River Murray Water.  The 
increased flows are likely to be beneficial but there remain a number of 
questions about the pattern of water flow.  Is it desirable from the 
perspective of the health of the waterways to have relatively constant flows 
or is it desirable to mimic natural patterns with episodic flooding?  Are 
people in the community comfortable with periodic flooding?  Is periodic 
flooding compatible with SA Water operations? 
As another example, SA Water has a sewage treatment plant at Hahndorf.  
Treated water is put into the Hahndorf Creek, and ultimately this water 
reaches the Onkaparinga River.  The Hahndorf Sewage Treatment Works 
currently serves the townships of Oakbank, Balhannah and Hahndorf.  The 
facility was built in phases with plant no.1 built in 1977 and plant no.2 was 
added in 1992-93.  The second plant was required with the increase in MOVING BEYOND MINIMUM STANDARDS 
 





population in the area.  Sewage enters the plant and is treated and 
reclaimed water is treated and discharged into Hahndorf Creek and then 
into the Onkaparinga River and from there to Mount Bold Reservoir.  The 
water from Mount Bold reservoir is then directed into the Happy Valley 
Reservoir and from here filtered and distributed to the southern suburbs 
of Adelaide. 
With the Hahndorf plant, there are concerns being expressed within the 
Catchment regarding whether the location of the plant is appropriate.  
While the average level of phosphorus, oxidated nitrogen, etc is low23, is 
the optimal cost/health of the Catchment trade-off being achieved?  Could 
the same type of re-use initiatives used at Bird in Hand be possible at 
Hahndorf?  These are questions which do not have immediate answers but 
do require consideration. 
                                            
23 See Appendix II 
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6 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
This report has identified several areas which may restrict or impede the 
ability of the Board to manage the water resources of the Catchment.  The 
INRM Bill may represent the most serious impediment, depending on the 
model that is adopted.  In particular, the Board could lose access to 
positive instruments such as funding.  The other impediments identified in 
the report will constrain the ability of the Board to contemplate new 
strategies such as efficient use of reclaimed water. 
The next report will consider the various mechanisms that could be used 
to move the management of water away from the minimum to provide 
incentives to engage in management strategies to exceed the standards.  
Considerable scope exists for mechanisms that move people to respond to 
signals and exceed targets. REFERENCES 
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WATER RESOURCES ACT 1997—SECTION 92 
92. (1) A Catchment water management board must prepare a draft 
Catchment water management plan in relation to the water resources of 
its Catchment area. 
(2) The s must be in a form approved by the Minister and must comply 
with this Division. 
(3) The plan must- 
(a) include information (which must be, as far as practicable, accurate at the 
date of publication of the draft plan) of a kind prescribed by regulation as 
to- 
(i) the quantity and the quality of the water comprising the water resources 
of the board's Catchment area; and 
(ii) the health of the ecosystems that depend on that water; and 
(b) assess the need for water of those ecosystems; and 
(c) identify the water resources (if any) in the board's Catchment area that 
are suitable for recreational use and should be preserved or enhanced for 
that purpose; and 
(d) outline the relevant economic, environmental and social considerations 
relating to the management of water resources in the board's Catchment 
area; and 
(e) set out the board's goals in relation to water resource management in 
the board's Catchment area and explain how achievement of those goals 
will implement the object of this Act; and 
(f) set out the method or methods the board will use- 
(i) to assess the extent to which it has succeeded in implementing its plan; 
and 
(ii) to assess the extent to which implementation of its plan has succeeded 
in achieving the board's goals; and 
(iii) to monitor the quantity and quality of the water in its water resources 
and the health of the ecosystems that depend on that water; and 
(g) set out the board's program for implementing its plan including, if 
applicable- 
(i) the diversion of water from, or to, a specified watercourse, lake or 
underground aquifer; and 
(ii) the holding of water in a specified lake or underground aquifer; and APPENDIX I 
 





(iii) modification of a specified watercourse or lake or excavation of an 
artificial lake; and 
(iv) methods for improving the quality of water of the water resources in 
the board's Catchment area and the health of ecosystems that depend on 
that water; and 
(v) drainage of specified land; and 
(vi) methods for encouraging the sustainable use of water; and 
(h) take into account any relevant bushfire prevention plan prepared under 
the Country Fires Act 1989; and 
(i) identify the changes (if any) that are necessary or desirable to- 
(i) a Development Plan under the Development Act 1993 or to any Act or 
subordinate legislation; or 
(ii) any activity of a constituent Council or controlling authority or to the 
manner in which, or the means by which, a constituent Council or 
controlling authority performs its functions or exercises its powers; or 
(iii) the activities of any other person, 
to further the object of this Act; and 
(j) identify land that adjoins or is adjacent to a watercourse or lake the use 
of which should be vested in the board by proclamation; and 
(k) identify the infrastructure the use of which should be vested in the 
board by proclamation; and 
(l) set out the matters that the board will consider when exercising its 
power to grant or refuse permits for activities affecting water; and 
(m) if staff are to be employed by the board-identify the number that the 
board is likely to employ, the qualifications they will require and the likely 
salary range for each position; and 
(n) include an estimate of the expenditure necessary in each year of the 
first three years of the plan for the implementation of the plan; and 
(o) state the source of funds necessary to meet the expenditure for each 
year and, if more than one source, the proportion of the funds to be raised 
from each source; and 
(p) if the source, or one of the sources, of those funds is a levy under 
Division 1 or 2 of Part 8-include an assessment of the expected social 
impact of the imposition of the levy; and 
(q) include such other information or material as is contemplated by this 
Act or is required by regulation. 
(4) The program to be set out under subsection (3)(g) must relate to a 
period of three financial years which must be specified in the plan. APPENDIX I 
 





(5) If a plan is adopted after 1 July in a financial year the period from its 
adoption to 30 June in that year will be regarded as the first year for the 
purposes of subsection (4). 
(6) A plan must be consistent with the State Water Plan. 
(7) A plan, when adopted, and amendments made to a plan must, as far as 
practicable, be consistent with- 
(a) any relevant management plan under the Coast Protection Act 1972; 
and 
(b) any relevant Development Plan under the Development Act 1993; and 
(c) any relevant environment protection policy under the Environment 
Protection Act 1993; and 
(d) any relevant plan of management under the National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1972; and 
(e) any relevant district plan under the Soil Conservation and Land Care 
Act 1989; and 
(f) guidelines relating to the management of native vegetation adopted by 
the Native Vegetation Council under the Native Vegetation Act 1991; and 
(g) such other plans, policies or guidelines as are prescribed by regulation. 
(8) The board must inform the Minister of the inconsistencies (if any) 
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Table 7.1  Comparison of Raw Sewage and Treated Wastewater 
 

























3/06/1997  210  226  38 51 10  650  <  2 15 3.5 6     
17/06/1997  220  300  58 73  9 680  <  2 17 3.5 6 0.7  0.6 
1/07/1997  265  355  66 85 12  690  <  2 15 5.3 8     
22/07/1997  300  300 53  65  12 700 <  2 18 6.2  8  0.9 0.5 
19/08/1997  253  308 41  54  12 770 <  2 15 2.2  6  1.5 0.5 
1/09/1997  158  215  30 42  8 810  <  2 14 7.1 9     
15/09/1997  215  308  47 63  9 820  <  2 14 2.0 5 0.5  0.5 
13/10/1997  263  330  37 55 13  860  <  2 10 0.4 2     
21/10/1997  110  142  13 23  8 860  <  1 12 0.2 2 0.6  0.4 
3/11/1997    225     11  770    11      
17/11/1997  345  390  42 65 13  830  <  2 15    2 0.1   
16/12/1997  213  193  46 56 11  810  <  2 8 <  2 3 0.6  0.4 
19/01/1998  238  253  53 72 14  790  <  2 6 <  2 1 0.6  0.4 
3/02/1998  235  255  45  62  13  770  < 2  5  < 2  < 2     
17/02/1998  295  266 44  55  14 780 <  2  7  0.4 <  2 0.5 0.4 
AVG 221  254.13  38.33 51.67 10.56  724.38  < 2  11.38  1.2  4  0.7  0.5 
 
BOD   Biochemical oxygen demand is an indirect measure of the 
pollutional strength of a wastewater (ie the concentration of 
putrescible organic matter present). Organic matter may be 
present in particulate form or dissolved.  
SS  Suspended solids concentration – the fine, suspended 
particulate organic and inorganic matter present in 
wastewater. 
NH3  Ammonia concentration (ammonia nitrogen). 
TKN  Total Kjeldahl nitrogen – the total concentration of organic 
nitrogen (proteins etc) and ammonia (inorganic nitrogen) 
present in a wastewater. Total nitrogen TN = TKN + 
Oxidised nitrogen 
OxdN Oxidised nitrogen – nitrate (NO3– ) and nitrite (NO2–) 
forms of nitrogen. In activated sludge processes, ammonia is 
biologically oxidised to nitrite then nitrate, a process APPENDIX II 
 





referred to as nitrification. Denitrification consists of 
biologically reducing oxidised nitrogen to the harmless 
gaseous nitrogen form (N2).  
TP  Total concentration of phosphorous (dissolved and 
particulate forms). 
TDS  Total dissolved solids concentration – one measure of 
salinity.  
Source:  SA Water 
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